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Comment on Griffith’s Deal Insurance: 
The Continuing Scramble Among 
Professionals 
Abraham J.B. Cable† 
In his recent article, Professor Sean Griffith observes a sub-
stantial development in the M&A market. Increasingly, buyers 
and sellers replace traditional deal terms with an insurance 
product—representation and warranty insurance (“RWI”). This 
essay considers how this new product and the insurance profes-
sionals who sell and underwrite it affect the traditional role of 
M&A lawyers. It concludes that RWI, in its present form, does not 
substantially encroach on the traditional role of M&A lawyers. 
But it also notes that representations and warranties are ripe for 
technological innovation and that insurance professionals may 
be better positioned then lawyers to seize the opportunity. 
INTRODUCTION 
Nearly 35 years ago, Professor Ronald Gilson provided the 
seminal account of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) lawyers.1 
Gilson sought to move beyond a caricature of deal lawyers as 
value-destroying nitpickers arguing over comma placement. In-
stead, he portrayed them as “transaction-cost engineers” who de-
sign processes and agreements that help buyers and sellers over-
come obstacles to mutually beneficial transactions.2 Though 
legal scholars have critiqued and refined Gilson’s formulation,3 
 
†  Professor, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. For 
helpful comments, the author thanks Spencer Williams, Sean Griffith, and par-
ticipants in the 2019 BYU Winter Deals Conference and the summer 2019 Bay 
Area Corporate Law Workshops. 
 1. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills 
and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 267–94 (1984). 
 2. See id. at 253–56. 
 3. For alternative depictions of deal lawyers, see generally Elisabeth De 
Fontenay, Law Firm Selection and the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 41 J. 
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it remains foundational in legal scholarship and legal educa-
tion.4 
In his recent article, Professor Sean Griffith describes an 
important inflection point in transaction-cost engineering, war-
ranting reflection on the central position of lawyers in M&A 
transactions.5 After all, Gilson focused his analysis largely on 
representations and warranties (together, “reps”)6 and related 
indemnities in a typical acquisition agreement.7 Today, in nearly 
a third of private-company acquisitions, buyers and sellers sub-
stantially or completely replace liability under these provisions 
with an insurance product—representation and warranty insur-
ance (RWI).8 This product was obscure just five years ago.9 As 
 
CORP. L. 393 (2015) (emphasizing law firm knowledge of market information); 
George W. Dent, Jr., Business Lawyers as Enterprise Architects, 64 BUS. LAW. 
279 (2009); Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. 
REV. 15 (1995) (emphasizing reputation brokering); Steven L. Schwarcz, Ex-
plaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 486 
(2007) (emphasizing reduction of regulatory costs). 
 4. See John C. Coates IV, Allocating Risk Through Contract: Evidence 
from M&A and Policy Implications, 5 (May 17, 2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2133343 [https://perma.cc/677P-NX22] (describing 
Gilson’s account as “seminal”). 
 5. See generally Sean J. Griffith, Deal Insurance: Representation & War-
ranty Insurance in Mergers and Acquisitions, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1839 (2020).  
 6. I follow Griffith’s lead in referring to representations and warranties by 
the more manageable term “reps.” See id. at 1841. 
 7. See Gilson, supra note 1, at 267–94. 
 8. An American Bar Association deal study reported that acquisition 
agreements for 30% of private company acquisitions by public companies (i.e., 
strategic buyers) referenced RWI. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PRIVATE 
TARGET MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS DEAL POINTS STUDY (2017). Materials 
from AON Corporation, a prominent insurance broker, suggest that use in pri-
vate equity transactions is substantially higher. AON CORPORATION, M&A 
TRANSACTION SOLUTIONS: RISK IN REVIEW (2018), https://www.aon.com/ 
getmedia/0c91accf-ab1e-44a1-9587-4bfa3a01ce1c/Aon-Risk-in-Review-Report-
2018.aspx [https://perma.cc/R46N-RE7H] (estimating that 75% of private eq-
uity deals use RWI). 
 9. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1877 (showing a pronounced increase in 
RWI adoption starting in 2014); see also AIG, WHAT HAPPENS AFTER THE DEAL 
CLOSES? WARRANTY AND INDEMNITY INSURANCE GLOBAL CLAIMS STUDY (2016), 
https://www.aiginsurance.nl/content/dam/aig/emea/belgium/documents/reports 
-and-white-papers/m_and_a_what_happens_after_the_deal_closes.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/8XSY-FNPC] (stating that the insurance company AIG has issued 
RWI policies since the 1990s but has seen rapid growth in recent years); Hamed 
Meshki & Brandon Vongsawad, Why You Need M&A Reps & Warranties Insur-
ance, KIRKLAND & ELLIS (July 31, 2013), https://www.kirkland.com/ 
publications/article/2013/07/why-you-need-ma-reps-and-warranties-insurance 
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Griffith details, the emergence of RWI marks an important re-
finement, or re-engineering, of deal design as buyers and sellers 
no longer just allocate risk between themselves but instead of-
fload risk to a third party for a fixed price.10 As Griffith explores, 
this outsourcing of risk raises important questions about the in-
centives RWI creates for transacting parties11 and the efficiency 
and sustainability of this new insurance market.12  
This essay picks up where Griffith leaves off, returning to 
Gilson’s motivating question about why deal lawyers, instead of 
other advisors, design M&A transactions. Gilson’s account, 
though favorable, was not laudatory in tone. He situated lawyers 
in a “scramble among professionals” and noted that the legal pro-
fession’s preeminent role in deal making was vulnerable because 
the engineering function is not inherently legal.13 RWI now in-
terjects new species of deal professionals into the mix—insur-
ance brokers and underwriters (together, “insurance profession-
als”).  
After a brief literature review, this essay describes the anat-
omy of a typical insured deal. This description supplements Grif-
fith’s account by focusing on professional roles. It is based on a 
mix of publicly available practitioner materials, materials pro-
vided by insurance brokers, and original interviews with M&A 
lawyers, general counsel, and insurance professionals.14 By this 
 
[https://perma.cc/G7ZW-YDLF] (stating that RWI existed as early as the 1990s, 
but was used reactively when negotiations around indemnification obligations 
failed); Joseph Verdesca et al., Representations and Warranties Insurance: What 




PPTW](stating that, until “a few years ago,” RWI was “the poor stepchild” of 
insurance policies); George H. Wang, Representation and Warranties Insurance 
in Cross-Border Transactions, HAYNESBOON (April 29, 2015), https://www 
.haynesboone.com/alerts/representation-and-warranty-insurance-in-cross 
-border-transactions [https://perma.cc/M4MU-E7JC] (stating that RWI was 
available in the 1990s, but was used only when negotiations faltered). 
 10. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1842 (“The fact that transacting parties 
now commonly avoid liability for misinformation by shifting the risk to an in-
surer thus comes as an affront to the standard account of M&A contracting.”). 
 11. See id. at 1872–75(discussing problems of adverse selection and moral 
hazard). 
 12. See id. at 1886–920 (manuscript at 32–55) (on file with the author) (con-
sidering why transacting parties buy RWI and why insurers sell RWI). 
 13. See Gilson, supra note 1, at 244. 
 14. I have completed 18 semi-structured interviews. I located interviewees 
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account, the key attribute of RWI in its present state is deference 
to existing M&A process. Insurers rely primarily on buyers, 
sellers, and their lawyers to vigorously negotiate suitable reps 
and to conduct suitable diligence on the seller’s operations, 
thereby limiting disruption of the M&A ecosystem.15 In this 
form, the current state of RWI speaks to the durability of the 
legal profession’s central role in M&A transactions.  
But there is a caveat. Reps seem ripe for technological inno-
vation in the form of sophisticated data analysis, and insurers 
may be better situated than law firms to lead these efforts.16 
Armed with more predictive power, insurers might be more as-
sertive in dictating acquisition agreement terms and diligence 
practices.17 In short, RWI is worth keeping an eye on. 
I. M&A LAWYERS 
Since Gilson initially posed his question about the value of 
transactional lawyers, a significant amount of literature has fol-
lowed. This body of work has generally expanded on Gilson’s in-
itial formulation by identifying additional functions and attrib-
utes of deal lawyers. Before turning to RWI as a case study, it is 
helpful to briefly summarize this literature. 
A. FUNCTIONS 
As a first step in understanding why lawyers play a central 
role in M&A transactions, this subsection starts with a threshold 
question: what are the basic functions of an M&A lawyer?  
1. Agreement Design (Transaction-Cost Engineering)  
Gilson’s account focused on the role of lawyers in designing 
(drafting and negotiating) acquisition agreements. His analysis 
was based largely on the reps and associated indemnities 
through which sellers make promises about the condition of the 
target business.18 These provisions continue to be prominent in 
 
through professional connections, internet searches, and referrals by interview-
ees. The current occupations of the interviewees are: M&A lawyer at law firm 
(3), RWI specialist at law firm (2), general counsel at frequent buyer or seller 
(2), RWI broker (6), and underwriter (5). A substantial majority of interviewees 
began their careers as M&A lawyers at law firms. See infra note 169. 
 15. See infra Part II.B.3 & 4 (describing negotiation of representations and 
warranties and due diligence in insured deals). 
 16. See infra III.B (discussing the potential for technological innovation). 
 17. See id. 
 18. See Gilson, supra note 1, at 267–94. 
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scholarly portrayals of deal lawyers. Most basically, they occupy 
a large percentage of a typical acquisition agreement—arguably 
the most tangible evidence or “tracks” from a deal lawyers’ 
work.19 They also soak up a large percentage of a deal lawyer’s 
time.20 In fact, the unfavorable view that Gilson sought to de-
bunk can likely be traced to the tough sledding of negotiating 
these detailed descriptions of the seller’s business, scheduling 
exceptions, and specifying limits to related liabilities. Commen-
tators continue to see these lengthy provisions as fertile ground 
for inefficient “churning” by deal lawyers.21  
If one steps back, however, and looks at the broader M&A 
process, reps appear as a kind of scaffolding for a more valuable 
project of information exchange and production. In economic ter-
minology, M&A transactions must overcome pervasive informa-
tional asymmetry. Sellers tend to know more about certain as-
pects of their business than buyers.22 Representations and 
warranties give the seller an opportunity to provide a systematic 
and credible description of the business and its risks. This ac-
count is credible in part because a seller agrees to be liable for 
inaccuracies through the agreement’s indemnification clause.23  
The engineering does not stop with the reps. Limits on in-
demnification, various purchase price adjustments, and require-
ments for third-party reports can all be understood as mitigating 
information asymmetry, differences in risk preference, and val-
uation difficulties that might otherwise impede mutually bene-
ficial transactions.24 
 
 19. See John C. Coates IV, Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? Evidence 
from Twenty Years of Deals 49 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Pa-
per No. 333/2016, 2016) (reporting results of an empirical study of publicly 
available acquisition agreements); Gilson, supra note 1, at 257, 270.  
 20. See id. at 270.  
 21. See, e.g., Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, The Inefficient Evolution 
of Merger Agreements, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 57, 61 (2017). 
 22. See Coates, supra note 4, at 13 (“The target’s prior managers can be 
expected to have better information about [risks associated with the target’s 
business]”); Gilson, supra note 1, at 269 (“[A]s a simple result of its prior opera-
tion of the business, the seller will already have large amounts of information 
concerning the business that the buyer does not have, but would like to ac-
quire.”). 
 23. Coates, supra note 4, at 10 (discussing how a combination of represen-
tations and post-closing indemnification reduce information asymmetry); Gil-
son, supra note 1, at 281–82 (describing how post-closing liability helps verify 
information provided by the seller). 
 24. For a recent and thorough review of literature providing economic anal-
ysis of M&A acquisition agreements, see Coates, supra note 4, at 3–9. 
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2. Additional Functions 
Professor Stephen Schwarcz pushed back somewhat on Gil-
son’s formulation by restoring more squarely legal work to the 
core of transactional lawyering. Through survey research, 
Schwarcz suggested that legal compliance is the primary func-
tion of deal lawyers.25 Lawyers must be well-versed in some reg-
ulatory schemes (corporate approval requirements) and alert to 
others (banking regulation, antitrust, tax, etc.). Guiding the deal 
through these regulations is a specialized field of compliance—
what Schwarcz deemed “transaction-regulatory” work.26 Accord-
ing to Schwarcz’s research, both lawyers and clients view this 
transaction-regulatory work as more important than designing 
deals to reduce transaction costs between buyer and seller.27 
Commentators have also expanded the list of nonlegal func-
tions performed by deal lawyers. For example, law firms provide 
substantial project-management services.28 Bringing a transac-
tion to completion requires coordinating due diligence, the in-
volvement of several different experts (auditors and the like), 
and other logistical matters. In other words, lawyers do not just 
negotiate the terms of merger agreements—they help execute 
them. 
Sometimes lawyers absorb transactional risk—another key 
function. Most explicitly, they offer legal opinions to transaction 
counterparties. For example, a lawyer for the seller might de-
liver an opinion to the buyer regarding proper corporate ap-
proval of the transaction, the seller’s capital structure, and other 
customary matters, thereby serving as a kind of insurer against 
those risks.29  
 
 25. See Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 501–02 (reporting survey results).  
 26. See id. at 492–93, 501–02 (defining transaction-regulatory work). 
 27. See id. at 501–02 (reporting survey results). 
 28. See Joseph M. Green, Legaltech and the Future of Startup Lawyering, 
in MAPPING LEGAL INNOVATION: TRENDS & PERSPECTIVES 7–8 (A. Masson, D. 
Orozco & G. Robinson, eds.) (forthcoming) (identifying project management as 
a core function of transactional lawyers). 
 29. See Heather M. Field, Tax Lawyers as Tax Insurance, 60 WM & MARY 
L. REV. 2111, 2114 (2019) (considering the extent to which transactional tax 
lawyers serve an insurance function when issuing tax opinions and concluding 
that “Transactional tax lawyers, by rendering tax opinions, provide an element 
of insurance to clients”); Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as 
Facilitator: Lawyers and the Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 
21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 679, 695 (1996) (discussing how transactional lawyers 
in Silicon Valley assume risk for client representations through legal opinions). 
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B. ATTRIBUTES 
This same literature tries to explain why lawyers, rather 
than other kinds of advisors, serve these varied functions. In 
some instances, the answer to that question is not obvious. For 
example, Gilson noted that the design function could be per-
formed by other advisors (bankers or accountants) who are an-
gling for a “larger piece of the action.”30 Of course, a merger is a 
legal act governed by a statute, a merger agreement can give rise 
to remedies defined by contract law, and the agreement touches 
on a wide range of technical legal specialties such as tax, em-
ployment, and environmental law. But the design function that 
Gilson describes as the deal lawyer’s core competency is not itself 
inherently legal in the sense of requiring traditional legal edu-
cation or licensing.  
Since there is little evidence that M&A lawyers have sub-
stantially given way to other deal professionals,31 there must be 
something about deal lawyers that accounts for their persistence 
in nonlegal functions. In fact, the literature describes a number 
of attributes that might make lawyers hard to dislodge: econo-
mies of scope, reputation, and market knowledge.32  
Lawyers are necessary (and have a monopoly on)33 squarely 
legal services. Through these necessary legal services, lawyers 
presumably acquire significant information about the client and 
the deal. Their involvement in non-legal work may produce econ-
omies of scope—it is sometimes more efficient for an existing ad-
visor to pick up additional tasks than to get a new advisor up to 
speed.34 
 
 30. Gilson, supra note 1, at 244, 296–306. 
 31. One indication that lawyers maintain their central roles in M&A trans-
actions is the sustained scholarly interest in the topic. See supra note 3 (citing 
legal scholarship examining the central role of deal lawyers). The legal trade 
press also suggests that M&A practice remains a prominent part of large-firm 
practice. See CITI HILDEBRANDT, 2019 CLIENT ADVISORY 8 (2019), https:// 
www.privatebank.citibank.com/ivc/docs/2019CitiHildebrandtClientAdvisory 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/85ST-EPK7] (“Law firm leaders identified M&A/transac-
tional work as the primary driver [of revenue growth in 2019].”). 
 32. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 494. 
 33. State laws prohibit the unauthorized practice of law by nonlawyers. See 
e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6125–33 (2018). 
 34. See Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 494 (discussing the hypothesis that law-
yers create economies of scope); Gilson, supra note 1, at 290, 298 (discussing 
economies of scope). 
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Lawyers might also build valuable reputations through per-
forming traditional legal work and other tasks.35 These reputa-
tions might enhance trust between the buyer and seller as the 
lawyer has something to lose by becoming involved with an un-
worthy client.36 In other words, lawyers can grease the wheels of 
transactions by lending their reputation to a client.  
Recently, Professor Elizabeth De Fontenay emphasized an-
other important attribute—market knowledge.37 Lawyers build 
valuable precedential databases through involvement in a high 
volume of deals. Whether through formal studies, knowledge 
management personnel, or ad hoc searches of document manage-
ment systems, law firms house a great deal of nonpublic infor-
mation on transactions. This insight might aid in the design of 
deal documents, as clients seek advice on “what’s market.”38 
One could also take a more skeptical view of lawyers’ staying 
power. One could look at the expansive role of lawyers as simply 
more evidence of agency costs in the lawyer-client relationship. 
Because of information asymmetry between lawyer and client,39 
perhaps clients have a difficult time discerning the proper role 
of lawyers, monitoring their work, and preventing lawyers from 
padding their bills with inefficient nonlegal work. 
 
 35. See Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 493 (characterizing reputational inter-
mediation as “the most agreed upon scholarly theory of the value added by 
transactional lawyers”); Okamoto, supra note 3, at 18 (providing on overview of 
a theory of reputational intermediaries based on the work of Gilson and others); 
Gilson, supra note 1, at 290, 298 (discussing the value of reputation). For a dis-
cussion of reputational intermediaries more generally, see Ronald J. Gilson & 
Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 
(1984). 
 36. See Okamoto, supra note 3, at 18 (discussing the conditions under 
which reputation can act as an effective commitment or bond). 
 37. See De Fontenay, supra note 3, at 396 (“[L]aw firms that repeatedly 
engage in the same type of high-stakes transactions acquire private information 
about the range of plausible deal terms and their current market prices that 
other players cannot replicate.”).  
 38. See id. at 396 (“This expertise in the ever-changing, ever-expanding set 
of ‘market’ deal terms provides clients with a valuable bargaining advantage in 
deal negotiations.”).  
 39. See id. at 399 (“The law firm-client relationship poses the classic agency 
problem: the principal (here, the client) lacks complete information about the 
agent’s (the law firm’s) performance of its duties, which allows the agent to act 
to some degree in its own interests at the expense of the principal’s.”). 
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II. A CASE STUDY: RWI 
RWI presents a valuable case study of the scramble among 
deal professionals. As Griffith describes, RWI presents a mean-
ingful change to a core component of the M&A deal process.40 
And this transformation is led in part by nonlawyer deal profes-
sionals, raising at least the possibility of an encroachment on the 
traditional role of M&A lawyers.  
To better assess the implications for lawyers, this part 
draws from Griffith’s account, publicly available practitioner 
materials, and original interviews to describe RWI in its current 
form. This account supplements Griffith’s study by focusing spe-
cifically on the roles of deal professionals. 
A. BASICS 
As Griffith reports, RWI was rare, at least in the U.S., until 
about five years ago.41 The growth of RWI in the U.S. is closely 
associated with a boom in the private equity sector.42 With a 
large number of carriers now offering the product,43 it is cur-
 
 40. See supra note 10. 
 41. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1877 (showing a pronounced increase in 
acquisition agreement references to RWI starting in 2014); supra note 9 (citing 
practitioner materials describing the rapid increase in RWI). 
 42. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1907 (“RWI is predominantly used in pri-
vate equity deals, often when private equity is on both sides of the transaction. 
Moreover, survey respondents overwhelmingly ranked private equity first in 
driving the use of RWI.”); supra note 8 (reporting use of RWI in a high percent-
age of private equity transactions). 
 43. See Interview with Interviewee #1, Anonymous Lawyer (on file with au-
thor) [hereinafter Interviewee #1] (estimating “three or four credible players” in 
2014 and 20–25 currently); Interview with Interviewee #2, Anonymous Insur-
ance Professional (on file with author) [hereinafter Interviewee #2] (estimating 
over 20 insurers or underwriters currently); Interview with Interviewee #3, 
Anonymous Insurance Professional (on file with author) [hereinafter Inter-
viewee #3] (estimating five RWI carriers in 2015 and over 20 currently); Inter-
view with Interviewee #9, Anonymous Insurance Professional (on file with au-
thor) [hereinafter Interviewee #9] (estimating 25–27 RWI carriers in the 
current market); Interview with Interviewee #12, Anonymous Insurance Pro-
fessional (on file with author) [hereinafter Interviewee #12] (estimating 24 
“markets” for RWI); Jeffrey Chapman, et al., Representations and Warranties 
Insurance in M&A Transactions, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE. (Dec. 
11, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/12/11/representations-and 
-warranties-insurance-in-ma-transactions/ [https://perma.cc/7AFZ-22VB] (“As 
RWI has gained market acceptance over the last few years, a significant number 
of new insurers have entered the RWI market.”). 
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rently a competitive market with declining premiums and ex-
panding coverage.44 
A typical RWI policy in today’s market has the following at-
tributes: 
• The buyer as insured party, receiving coverage for 
breaches of the seller’s reps.45  
• Coverage (the insured amount) equaling 10% of the deal 
price, roughly corresponding to customary caps on in-
demnification in non-RWI deals.46  
• A premium, paid up front, equal to 2.5-3% of the cover-
age amount.47  
• Exclusions for certain reps, such as unfunded pension 
liabilities.48 
• Exclusions for anything known by the buyer at the time 
of closing, such as matters listed on the seller’s disclo-
sure schedules.49 
• A retention (deductible) of approximately 1% of the 
transaction amount, which is often allocated between 
the buyer and seller in the acquisition agreement.50  
 
 44. See Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (discussing the effects of competition 
on premiums); Interview with Interviewee #5, Anonymous Lawyer (on file with 
author) [hereinafter Interviewee #5] (discussing the effects of competition on 
premiums). 
 45. Seller-side policies are also available. Under this form of policy, the 
seller remains fully liable for breaches of reps under the acquisition agreement, 
and the policy backstops those obligations. These policies are currently rare. See 
Griffith, supra note 5, at 1866 (reporting that over 90% of policies sold in recent 
years are buyer-side policies); Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (estimating that 
95% of policies are buyer-side); Interviewee #9, supra note 43 (describing seller-
side policies as rare). 
 46. See Griffith, supra note 5,at 1867; Steven Lee & Ai Tajima, M&A 
Trends: Representations and Warranties Insurance, GOODWIN INSIGHTS FOR 
PRIVATE EQUITY & M&A (Mar. 22, 2018) (reporting information from a survey 
of 75 private equity firms). 
 47. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1867; Chapman, supra note 43; Lee, supra 
note 46; Verdesca, supra note 9. 
 48. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1868(noting that standard exceptions are 
narrowing); Lee, supra note 46; Verdesca, supra note 9. 
 49. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1868; Chapman, supra note 43, at 2; Lee, 
supra note 46. 
 50. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1867–68; Lee, supra note 46; Verdesca, 
supra note 9. Sources also refer to increasing prominence of “no survival deals” 
that completely relieve the seller of liability under the representations and war-
ranties, as is typical in public company acquisitions. See, e.g., Griffith, supra 
note 5, at 1866; Lee, supra note 46 (discussing “no indemnity” deals); Verdesca 
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Insurers are developing new products intended to comple-
ment RWI. These policies might offer coverage for known claims, 
reps typically excluded from RWI policies, or other forms of lia-
bility under an acquisition agreement such as break-up fees.51 
RWI might therefore be viewed as part of an emerging class of 
“transactional liability” insurance. But for now, RWI is the core 
product. 
B. ANATOMY OF AN INSURED DEAL 
It typically takes about two weeks to negotiate, underwrite, 
and finalize (“bind”) an RWI policy.52 Over that period, the buyer 
will interact with an array of deal professionals. In order to bet-
ter define their roles, this part describes the key phases of an 
insured deal: 1) initiating a proposal, 2) negotiating a policy, 3) 
incorporating the policy into the acquisition agreement, 4) due 
diligence, and 5) claims resolution.  
1. Initiating a Proposal 
The first step is engaging a broker to solicit proposals from 
insurers. Several insurance brokerage firms maintain teams pri-
marily dedicated to RWI.53 These brokers are often former M&A 
lawyers.54 They cultivate relationships with insurers, leading 
 
supra note 9 (describing insurers’ increasingly willingness to eliminate seller 
liability). But interviewees describe the typical policy as still having a retention 
amount. See Interviewee #5, supra note 44 (reporting limited experience with 
no-survival deals); Interview with Interviewee #6, Anonymous Lawyer (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Interviewee #6]. 
 51. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43 (discussing additional forms of poli-
cies that have evolved around RWI, such as coverage for tax exposure or pend-
ing litigation); Interviewee #9, supra note 43 (discussing other “transactional 
products”); Interview with Interviewee #10, Anonymous Insurance Professional 
(on file with author) [hereinafter Interviewee #10] (discussing insurance for 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) and other deal-
related liability); Interview with Interviewee #11, Anonymous Lawyer (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Interviewee #11] (describing new transactional liabil-
ity policies).  
 52. See Interviewee #1, supra note 43 (reporting that the total time to ob-
tain a policy is now down to a week to 10 days); Interviewee #5, supra note 44 
(reporting that it takes about two to three weeks to obtain a policy).  
 53. See, e.g., Interviewee #2, supra note 43 (describing a broker’s RWI 
group); Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (describing a broker’s M&A division). 
 54. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43 (describing how former corporate law-
yers with experience in “the trenches” formed an RWI broker group); Inter-
viewee #9, supra note 43 (indicating that most RWI underwriters are former 
deal lawyers); Interviewee #10, supra note 51 (suggesting that experience as an 
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M&A law firms (as referral sources), and private equity firms (as 
potential clients).55 Once engaged, the broker’s duties run to the 
buyer seeking coverage.56 
The broker compiles basic information about the buyer, 
seller, and the deal. The broker provides this information to in-
surers to obtain proposals outlining pricing and basic terms such 
as the retention amount and standard exclusions.57 
When selecting among these proposals, buyers will consider 
a number of factors. Besides pricing and the scope of coverage, 
buyers think ahead to potential claims. An in-house lawyer for a 
frequent acquirer explains that an insurer’s willingness and 
ability to pay claims and pre-existing relationship with the buyer 
weighs heavily in selecting among proposals.58 A number of 
sources cite an emerging claims history (i.e., willingness of in-
surers to pay claims) as a significant factor in RWI’s recent 
growth.59 
2. Policy Negotiation 
Once the buyer selects among the proposals, the buyer and 
insurer negotiate the policy. RWI policies are relatively bespoke. 
An RWI is not a read-only document with limited modification 
 
M&A lawyer is necessary for a career as an RWI broker); see also Verdesca su-
pra note 9 (“Many of the large national insurance brokerages have specialized 
units that deal with reps and warranties insurance. These units, for the most 
part, are run not by ‘insurance people’ but by former M&A lawyers who left 
private practice to become dedicated resources at the brokerages.”).  
 55. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43 (describing brokers’ relationships 
with law firms and educational efforts); Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (discuss-
ing marketing efforts of brokers); Interview with Interviewee #7, Anonymous 
Insurance Professional (on file with author) [hereinafter Interviewee #7] (dis-
cussing attendance at M&A lawyer conferences). 
 56. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43. 
 57. See Richard D. Harroch, David E. Weiss, & Richard V. Smith, A Guide 
To M&A Representations And Warranties Insurance In Mergers And Acquisi-
tions, FORBES.COM (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness/ 
2019/01/23/guide-mergers-acquisitions-representations-warranties-insurance/ 
#192bffcf67f3 [https://perma.cc/N9Q2-KF26] (discussing information included 
in a request for proposal for RWI insurance). 
 58. See Interviewee #6, supra note 50. 
 59. See Chapman, supra note 43 (noting that “the stereotype that it is more 
difficult to collect under as RWI policy than under a customary seller indemnity” 
has been “broken” as insurers started paying out claims); Verdesca supra note 
9 (summarizing claims experience reported by two large insurers); Wang, supra 
note 9, at 4. 
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through pre-set endorsements.60 One interviewee explains that 
RWI “is never as rote as renter’s insurance.”61 Buyer’s counsel 
will mark up an RWI policy like any other deal document.62  
That said, market conventions are emerging. Industry pub-
lications list “standard” exceptions, policy features, and price 
ranges.63 Commentators describe nuanced custom emerging on 
some issues, such as whether an insurer will cover multiplied 
damages.64 
Buyers may have several advisors for the policy-negotiation 
phase. First, M&A lawyers have gained experience reviewing 
policies.65 Second, as described more fully below, firms increas-
ingly feature practice groups with dedicated RWI specialists who 
assist conventional M&A lawyers with policy negotiation.66 Fi-
nally, brokers assist in negotiating policies.67 
At this point, there is some overlap between the role of law-
yers and the role of brokers. Each brings something different to 
 
 60. See Interviewee #7, supra note 55 at 4; see also De Fontenay, supra note 
3, at 406 (“Consumer insurance contracts, for example, may have terms that are 
substantively identical from one insurer to the next and are never negotiated 
with the consumer.”).  
 61. Interviewee #5, supra note 44.  
 62. See Interviewee #7, supra note 55 (discussing which sections of the pol-
icy are most heavily commented on). 
 63. See supra notes 46–50 (describing the “typical” RWI policy based on in-
dustry publications). 
 64. In short, multiplied damages are a form of consequential damages that 
insurers initially resisted. Currently, insurers will not specifically exclude such 
damages from the policy if buyers do not expressly provide for such damages in 
the acquisition agreement. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1869 (“Although DIV/ 
multiplied damages had formerly been excluded from coverage under RWI pol-
icies, the market has now settled on a practice of ‘following silence with si-
lence.’”); Interviewee #7, supra note 55; Lee supra note 46. 
 65. See Interviewee #5, supra note 44 (“I can certainly markup a rep and 
warranty binder.”); Interviewee #7, supra note 55 (discussing how M&A lawyers 
are learning about insurance); Interview with Interviewee #14, Anonymous In-
surance Professional (on file with author) [hereinafter Interviewee #14] (stating 
that law firms lead policy negotiations). 
 66. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43 (observing that RWI groups at law 
firms assist in policy negotiation); Interview with Interviewee #4, Anonymous 
Insurance Professional (on file with author) [hereinafter Interviewee #4] (ex-
plaining that RWI groups at firms help negotiate policies). 
 67. See Interviewee #7, supra note 55 (explaining that a broker will become 
more involved in policy negotiation if buyer’s counsel is not knowledgeable 
about RWI); Interviewee #9, supra note 43 (explaining that an underwriter will 
negotiate with a broker, rather than buyer’s counsel, as long as the broker is 
knowledgeable about RWI).  
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the task. Brokers maintain relationships with insurers and so 
may have influence with them.68 They also see a larger volume 
of policies and so might have a better sense of market trends.69 
Lawyers, on the other hand, might benefit from a broader view 
of the deal and a healthy economic indifference as to whether a 
policy binds.70 
3. The Acquisition Agreement 
Gilson describes the acquisition agreement between the 
buyer and seller as a key artifact of the lawyer’s broader role. It 
is perhaps surprising, then, that RWI usually requires only mod-
erate changes to the standard form of acquisition agreement. 
To be sure, RWI leaves tracks in an acquisition agreement. 
Griffith observes that sellers’ maximum indemnity obligations 
go down considerably from the customary 10% to 1%. As Griffith 
notes, the 1% number corresponds to the typical RWI retention 
amount, suggesting that the parties allocate the retention 
through the indemnity.71 In Griffith’s data set, escrow accounts 
and baskets also scale down, suggesting they are used to allocate 
responsibility for the retention.72  
Griffith notes more subtle influences. When insurers are 
footing the bill, sellers are more likely to concede some buyer-
friendly terms such as generous materiality scrapes, undisclosed 
liability reps, and multiplied damages.73 These findings are sig-
nificant in that they show that “RWI transfers greater liability 
risk to the insurer than the typical seller would be willing to 
bear.”74 These findings are also consistent with interviewee ac-
counts and practitioner materials that cite the ability to “get bet-
ter reps” as a selling point of RWI.75  
 
 68. See Interviewee #4, supra note 66 (reporting that brokers have the pri-
mary relationship with the insurer); Interviewee #5, supra note 44 (suggesting 
that an M&A lawyer has limited direct interaction with insurers during policy 
negotiation); Interviewee #7, supra note 55 (describing the “leverage” that bro-
kers have with insurers). 
 69. See Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (reporting that a lawyer-turned-bro-
ker saw significantly more transactions as a broker); Interviewee #4, supra note 
66 (explaining that a large broker will see more deals than a lawyer). 
 70. See id. (observing that a broker receiving a commission has different 
incentives than a lawyer billing by the hour). 
 71. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1880. 
 72. See id. at 1880–81. 
 73. See id. at 1882–86.  
 74. Id. at 1886. 
 75. See Interviewee #1, supra note 43 (stating that a seller “gives a better 
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But from the perspective of deal process and professional 
roles, it is equally impressive how little changes in the acquisi-
tion agreement. As long as the seller retains some responsibility 
for a retention amount, the acquisition agreement will still fea-
ture a familiar looking indemnification for breaches of reps and 
associated caps, baskets, and escrows. Even where the policy 
lacks a retention, there is a good deal of risk allocation in the 
acquisition agreement. The parties may need to allocate respon-
sibility for known items that fall outside of the policy, specify 
whether or not the seller is responsible for claims in excess of the 
policy, and work out customary price adjustments for working 
capital and the like.76 
Perhaps most surprisingly, even the reps in an insured deal 
likely look similar on their face.77 One might expect that insurers 
would, as a matter of efficiency and risk management, dictate or 
standardize the wording and scope of the reps they insure. In the 
absence of such insurer control, one might expect moral hazard: 
sellers might become extremely generous in making promises for 
which insurers are mostly responsible.78 For a number of rea-
 
rep package” with RWI); Interviewee #7, supra note 55 (stating that buyers get 
“better reps” with RWI); Interview with Interviewee #13, Anonymous Insurance 
Professional (on file with author) [hereinafter Interviewee #13] (reporting that 
underwriters see comments of buyer’s counsel on acquisition agreements stat-
ing that “we’d expect a more expansive rep because there is rep and warranty 
insurance on this deal”); Interview with Interviewee #15, Anonymous Insurance 
Professional (on file with author) [hereinafter Interviewee #15] (reporting that 
sellers “give better reps” with RWI); Interview with Interviewee #16, Anony-
mous Insurance Professional (on file with author) [hereinafter Interviewee #16] 
(reporting seeing drafting notes between buyers and sellers indicating that they 
do not need to negotiate certain reps because they will be insured); Interview 
with Interviewee #17, Anonymous Lawyer (on file with author) [hereinafter In-
terviewee #17] (indicating that sellers give broader reps in insured deals); In-
terview with Interviewee #18, Anonymous Lawyer (on file with author) [herein-
after Interviewee #18] (indicating that sellers give more fulsome reps with 
RWI). 
 76. See PRACTICAL LAW CORPORATE & SECURITIES, PURCHASE AGREE-
MENT: REPRESENTATION & WARRANTY INSURANCE PROVISIONS (2019) (showing 
customary changes to an acquisition agreement to accommodate RWI); Inter-
viewee #6, supra note 50; Interviewee #11, supra note 51 (suggesting that over-
all negotiation time is similar for an insured deal and that the role of the lawyer 
will “pivot” to integrating insurance into the deal). 
 77. As a very rough measure, note that Griffith finds reps and warranties 
in insured deals to be similar in length to uninsured deals. See Griffith, supra 
note 5, at 1881. 
 78. See id. at 1874 (defining moral hazard as “the tendency of insurance to 
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sons, however, it appears that buyers and sellers still retain re-
sponsibility for negotiation of reps in an insured deal.79 
First, features of an RWI policy likely constrain sellers from 
being overly generous. Most basically, a majority of policies in-
clude retentions for which sellers are partly responsible.80 Insur-
ance scholarship has long recognized how deductibles curb moral 
hazard.81 In addition, even if insurers do not directly dictate the 
wording of representations and warranties, they do have tools to 
limit coverage. They can exclude or “write out” entire represen-
tations or particular phrasing that they believe fall outside the 
customary range for a particular type of deal.82  
Second, a number of practical considerations prevent insur-
ers from exerting tighter control of the acquisition agreement. A 
key selling point of RWI has been timely underwriting without 
significant disruption of existing deal process. Dictating acquisi-
tion agreement terms would undermine this goal.83 In addition, 
deal professionals do not view representations and warranties as 
 
increase loss by reducing the insured’s incentive to prevent it”). 
 79. Griffith reports:  
Although RWI underwriting generally begins before the acquisition agreement 
is finalized, insurers often do not typically comment on acquisition agreements. 
They do not mark-up drafts, and were they to do so, their comments would likely 
not be taken. Id. at 1892.  
See also Interviewee #16, supra note 75 (stating that in North America parties 
have little appetite for underwriter comments on reps). 
 80. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1912 (“Insurers generally manage moral 
hazard through the policy’s deductible and limits, terms that effectively allocate 
loss to the policy-holder, thereby maintaining ‘skin in the game.’”). 
 81. For an overview of moral hazard in the context of liability insurance 
products, see Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, The Law and Economics of Liabil-
ity Insurance: A Theoretical and Empirical Review (Univ. Pa. Inst. for Law & 
Econ., Research Paper No. 11-09, 2011), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=1783793 [https://perma.cc/2XQY-NFPM?type=image].  
 82. From the insured’s standpoint, “writing out” agreement language is 
preferable to excluding the subject matter from the policy. Specific language 
that is written out is ignored for purposes of determining insurance coverage, 
but the entire subject matter is not excluded from coverage. See Interviewee #5, 
supra note 44 (explaining the effect of “writing out” language); Interviewee #7, 
supra note 55 (explaining the distinction). 
 83. See Interviewee #1, supra note 43 (stating that insurers cannot dictate 
acquisition agreement terms because of market dynamics); Interviewee #7, su-
pra note 55 (stating that the market is too competitive for insurers to dictate 
acquisition terms); Interviewee #17, supra note 75 (reporting that buyers and 
seller emphasize speed when engaging a broker and that buyers and sellers 
would hesitate to work with an underwriter that substantially marked up ac-
quisition agreements). 
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one-size-fits all boilerplate. These provisions might appear for-
mulaic, but one would expect a buyer to bolster intellectual prop-
erty representations for purchase of a tech company and envi-
ronmental representations for purchase of a smelting operation. 
Insurers apparently value the role that experienced counsel can 
play in this customizing process.84 
In sum, buyers, sellers, and their lawyers still dictate agree-
ment terms, even if insurance shades incentives and insurers 
police the outer boundaries of acceptable risk. 
 4. Due Diligence 
Griffith notes that underwriters “diligenc[e] the diligence” 
of the buyer rather than performing independent investiga-
tions.85 In other words, like the approach to the acquisition 
agreement described above, due diligence for RWI “piggybacks” 
on the work of the buyer and seller.86 Interviewees use a number 
of different phrases to describe this dynamic. One interviewee 
describes the custom as “over-the-shoulder diligence.”87 Another 
states that the process is designed to “pressure-test” the buyer’s 
diligence.88  
To start the process, underwriters obtain access to the data 
room containing all of the materials that the seller provided to 
the buyer in response to the buyer’s diligence request. But un-
derwriters do not generally base their diligence on a de novo re-
view of that information. Instead, they rely heavily on diligence 
reports from the buyer’s legal, tax, and other advisors. These re-
ports are provided to the underwriter on a “non-reliance basis”—
underwriters sign a letter acknowledging that the reports cannot 
be the legal basis for a claim by the underwriter against the ad-
visor.89  
 
 84. See Interviewee #7, supra note 55 (explaining that deals for unique “fin-
gerprints” and the representations and warranties need to be customized); In-
terviewee #13, supra note 75 (suggesting that one obstacle to synthetic, insurer-
authored, reps is that insurers value the benefit of a seller’s negotiating efforts); 
Interviewee #14, supra note 65 (explaining that an underwriter wants to see 
that the agreement was evenly negotiated). 
 85. Griffith, supra note 5, at 1894 n. 268 (quoting an interviewee). See also 
Interviewee #9, supra note 43; Interviewee #13, supra note 75 (describing sec-
ondary due diligence by underwriters); Interviewee #14, supra note 65 (stating 
that underwriters are “auditing the buyer diligence”). 
 86. See Interviewee #1, supra note 43. 
 87. See Interviewee #4, supra note 66. 
 88. See Interviewee #1, supra note 43. 
 89. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43 (describing the non-reliance letter); 
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After the underwriter and its counsel review these reports 
from the buyer’s advisors, the parties and their advisors are 
ready for the main event: a “diligence call.” The underwriter and 
its counsel ask questions about the scope of the buyer’s diligence 
and any identified areas of risk.90 Underwriters are looking for a 
disconnect between a seller’s operations and risk profile and the 
buyer’s diligence. It would, for example, raise red flags if a seller 
had significant stakes in foreign subsidies and the buyer’s dili-
gence was primarily limited to domestic operations.91 If the in-
surer cannot get comfortable with the scope and quality of the 
buyer’s diligence on a particular matter, the insurer might limit 
the scope of coverage through writing out language in a repre-
sentation or creating a new policy exclusion.92 
As Griffith notes, there is hanging over this process more 
potential for moral hazard.93 RWI policies do not cover liabilities 
known to the buyer at closing. What prevents the buyer from 
engaging in theatrical due diligence designed to look effective to 
the underwriter but unlikely in fact to unearth exclusions?94  
 
Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (describing the customary reports); Interviewee 
#9, supra note 43 (describing materials received by the underwriter); Inter-
viewee #14, supra note 65 (describing non-reliance letters).  
 90. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43 (describing the diligence call); Inter-
viewee #3, supra note 43 (describing the diligence call and non-reliance letters); 
Interviewee #14, supra note 65 (describing the process for a diligence call at-
tended by specialized advisors); infra note 122 and accompanying text (describ-
ing the role of underwriter’s counsel).  
 91. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43; Interviewee #15, supra note 75; see 
also Interviewee #16, supra note 75 (explaining that an underwriter is looking 
for “adequately scoped” diligence). 
 92. See Interviewee #3, supra note 43; Interviewee #9, supra note 43; Inter-
viewee #14, supra note 65 (describing exclusions based on red flags from dili-
gence). 
 93. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1912(“[I]nsofar as RWI provides coverage 
only for risks that remain unknown, the parties may actively avoid uncovering 
information that, once revealed, will be excluded from coverage.”). 
 94. See Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (stating that diligence sometimes 
feels “like a game of chicken” because of the temptation to do “lighter diligence”); 
Interviewee #12, supra note 43 (suggesting that some law firms are resisting 
producing full diligence reports, and instead proposing to issue only “red flag” 
reports, potentially because longer reports will trigger exclusions); Interviewee 
#16, supra note 75 (explaining that an underwriter tries to be “alive to the ef-
fects of insurance”); Interviewee #18, supra note 75 (suggesting that RWI affects 
some private equity firms’ diligence process). However, some interviewees sug-
gest that the amount of diligence by buyer’s counsel has increased as insurers 
place increasing emphasis on the lawyer’s written diligence report. See Inter-
viewee #11, supra note 51; Interviewee #12, supra note 43. 
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Griffith identifies a number of mitigating factors. Buyers 
sign a no-claims declaration at closing; if a liability emerges, an 
insurer will “interrogate” the buyer’s knowledge and may void 
the policy.95 Less dramatically, coverage limits and retention 
amounts reduce incentives to short-arm diligence.96 RWI policies 
usually only cover 10% of the purchase price with the buyer often 
bearing the cost of failed diligence with consequences below re-
tention amounts or above policy limits.97 Diligence also serves 
important business purposes (synergies, integration, and the 
like) so it would be shortsighted to play ostrich just to improve 
RWI coverage.98 
In addition to these mitigating factors, one should not un-
derestimate the extent to which participants in this diligence 
process simply believe that over-the-shoulder diligence is effec-
tive. How can it be that such a cursory investigation, with at 
least ambiguous incentives, is sufficient to take on such consid-
erable risk? One potential clue is the weight that insurers accord 
law firm reputation. Interviewees describe prominent advisors 
as a kind of lubricant for getting an RWI policy underwritten and 
bound, and they note that lesser known advisors add time and 
expense to the process.99 The suggestion is that a prominent firm 
 
 95. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1915; Interviewee #5, supra note 44 (de-
scribing the no-claims declaration); Interviewee #7, supra note 55 (explaining 
that an RWI policy is void if there is fraud, and that there is no “mechanism” 
for moral hazard except “straight fraud”); Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (stating 
that the “loophole is fraud”); Interviewee #4, supra note 66; Interviewee #9, su-
pra note 43. 
 96. Griffith, supra note 5, at 1912–13. 
 97. Id. at 1866, 1912–13.  
 98. See id. at 1914–15; Interviewee #6, supra note 50 (stating that diligence 
is about “the validity of the business case”); Interviewee #10, supra note 51 (ex-
plaining that concerns other than liability motivate diligence); Interviewee #13, 
supra note 75 (explaining that purchasers “don’t want a shitty company at the 
end of the day”); Interviewee #14, supra note 65 (stating that “it is in the inter-
est of buyers to do good deals” and that buyers “don’t want a shit company”); 
Interviewee #16, supra note 75 (explaining that the buyer has to “live with” the 
company); Interviewee #18, supra note 75 (indicating that private equity funds 
will not skimp on diligence too much because they “still want a quality asset”). 
Relatedly, lawyers might worry that a truncated diligence process will result in 
a malpractice claim by the client. See Interviewee #11, supra note 51 (discussing 
malpractice exposure if a law firm shirks on diligence). 
 99. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43 (reporting that underwriters have 
“faith in quality advisors” such as “blue-chip law firms”); Interviewee #9, supra 
note 43 (explaining that lesser known advisors increase underwriting time and 
expense); Interviewee #14, supra note 65 (explaining that an underwriter wants 
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would incur a reputational hit if they pulled punches in insured 
deals.100 
Finally, this deferential approach to diligence may simply 
be a commercial necessity due to time and resource constraints. 
As described above, time is of the essence in M&A transactions 
and a lengthy additional underwriting process would be unat-
tractive.101 In addition, many underwriters are lean operations. 
As background, underwriters are themselves a kind of interme-
diary, linking buyers to “insurance capital.”102 Underwriters 
originate policies and process claims for a fee, but the capital of-
ten comes from large insurers such as Lloyd’s of London. Under-
writers themselves do not necessarily have the personnel to ef-
fectively diligence a large M&A transaction in the time 
provided.103 
In sum, a number of factors lead to a distinctive kind of dil-
igence. Unlike lawyers asked to give a third-party legal opinion 
or underwriters facing liability under federal securities law for a 
registered offering of securities,104 RWI underwriters do not per-
form much original diligence. Instead, they diligence the dili-
gence.  
 
to see “parity between the buyer and seller” and would be concerned about a 
small firm representing a founder). 
 100. See Interviewee #17, supra note 75 (suggesting that underwriters 
would be discouraged from working with a firm associated with deals with high 
insurer losses). These reputational constraints may extend to sellers as well. 
See Interviewee #12, supra note 43 (suggesting that private equity sellers are 
constrained by reputational concerns because they are repeat players); Inter-
viewee #16, supra note 75 (stating that reputational concerns of private equity 
sellers “checks” moral hazard); Interviewee #18, supra note 75 (suggesting that 
private equity sellers value their relationships with insurers). 
 101. See Interviewee #7, supra note 55 (stating that original diligence would 
be “unworkable” and “contrary to the ecosystem”). 
 102. See Interviewee #13, supra note 75 (explaining that managing general 
underwriters source policies for insurance capital in exchange for a fee). 
 103. See Interviewee #9, supra note 43 (explaining that “time and money” 
prevent leanly staffed underwriters from conducting their own diligence); Inter-
viewee #14, supra note 65 (explaining that underwriters are at a numerical dis-
advantage when negotiating with M&A law firms). 
 104. See generally DONALD W. GLAZER, ET AL., GLAZER & FITZGIBBON ON LE-
GAL OPINIONS (3rd ed. 2008) (discussing customary due diligence practices for 
lawyers giving third-party legal opinions); Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, 
Underwriter Due Diligence in Securities Offerings, N.Y. L. J., May 27, 1999 (dis-
cussing due diligence practices of underwriters of registered securities offer-
ings).  
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5. Claims 
If all goes well for the insurer, the story ends when the policy 
binds. But if a breach of the reps surfaces, the parties described 
above re-engage to resolve the claim. Buyers will usually work 
through their broker to assert a claim.105 Claims are ultimately 
managed by the underwriters.106 The buyer’s law firm might be-
come involved, especially if there are reasons to maintain attor-
ney-client privilege.107 Compared to an escrow in a traditional 
(uninsured) deal, there are advantages and disadvantages to 
this claims process.  
On the one hand, RWI reduces the “social” aspect of post-
closing claims. Often, a buyer, especially in the private-equity 
context, expects the seller to continue in a management capacity. 
It can be awkward to assert a claim in that circumstance, and it 
may be easier to bring a claim against an insurance company.108 
On the other hand, insurance companies “aren’t looking to write 
a lot of blank checks.”109 They are presumably experienced and 
sophisticated in responding to claims notices, reserving rights, 
and pursuing subrogation rights. 
III. EFFECTS ON LAWYERS 
Having introduced the cast of characters, this part considers 
where lawyers stand in this new deal environment. In short, the 
outsourcing of risk to insurance companies has not posed the 
substantial incursion one might on first glance expect. Instead, 
 
 105. See Interviewee #4, supra note 66; Interviewee #10, supra note 51 (dis-
cussing claims advocacy groups within brokers). 
 106. See Interviewee #9, supra note 43; Interviewee #13, supra note 75 (es-
timating that 30% of an underwriter’s time is spent managing claims); Inter-
viewee #14, supra note 65 (explaining that an underwriter spends significant 
time on claims). 
 107. See Interviewee #4, supra note 66 (discussing privilege considerations); 
Interviewee #11, supra note 51 (suggesting that a deal lawyer would work with 
firm litigators in handling indemnity claims); Interviewee #17, supra note 75 
(reporting that M&A lawyers work “hand-in-hand” with the firm’s litigation 
group on post-closing claims). 
 108. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43 (discussing the social aspect of bring-
ing claims against a seller); Interviewee #4, supra note 66 (discussing reluctance 
to bring claims against sellers); Interviewee #14, supra note 65 (explaining that 
it may be easier for buyers to bring claims against insurers than founders); In-
terviewee #17, supra note 75 (explaining that RWI helps avoid “undesirable con-
versations” with founder/managers). 
 109. Interviewee #4, supra note 66. 
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the story of RWI so far underscores the durability of M&A law-
yers’ central role. Still, RWI’s future is worth pondering because 
it is possible it evolves into a more assertive, and less deferential, 
feature of deal process. 
A. SO FAR, SO GOOD 
Practitioner materials sometimes tout RWI for its ability to 
streamline negotiation of acquisition agreements.110 Though 
smoother contracting sounds good from the client perspective, 
lawyers might not view it the same way. Lawyers, after all, prove 
their mettle in part by navigating contracting challenges. Put 
bluntly, easier negotiations might mean lower fees.111 
It is important, however, to put this potential streamlining 
effect in perspective. First, consider only the lawyer’s agreement 
design function.112 Even with RWI, there is still significant risk 
to engineer. Buyers and sellers will still negotiate and draft in-
demnities allocating responsibility for retention amounts, spe-
cial indemnities specifying responsibility for known risks, pur-
chase price adjustments, and associated escrows.113 An 
acquisition agreement also allocates another kind of risk—clos-
ing risk. The parties must agree on closing conditions, break-up 
fees, and the like.114 RWI might reduce the stakes of some nego-
 
 110. See Chapman, supra note 43 (suggesting that RWI can “meaningfully 
shorten” and “dramatically simplify” negotiations); Harroch, supra note 57 (sug-
gesting that RWI “simplifies and speeds up” negotiation); see also Griffith, supra 
note 5, at 1886 (reporting that survey respondents view RWI as making “acqui-
sition contracting more streamlined”); Interviewee #1, supra note 43 (referring 
to streamlined negotiation, especially in no-survival deals); Interviewee #4, su-
pra note 66 (suggesting that RWI can “grease the wheels of negotiation” but also 
introduces offsetting complications); Interviewee #5, supra note 44 (stating that 
a no-survival deal significantly speeds negotiations); Interviewee #14, supra 
note 65 (suggesting that RWI means significantly less work at M&A firms be-
cause of less negotiating with the seller); Interviewee #17, supra note 75 (ex-
plaining that private equity funds emphasize speed and certainty in completing 
transactions and that RWI is helpful in that regard). 
 111. See Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (suggesting that with RWI “you don’t 
spend nearly as much on legal costs”). 
 112. See supra Part I.A.1 (describing the lawyer’s design function based on 
Gilson’s account). 
 113. See supra Part II.C.3 (describing the effects of RWI on acquisition 
agreements); see also Interviewee #11, supra note 51 (discussing negotiations 
over retention amounts and concluding that overall time spent on negotiation 
is similar for an insured deal). 
 114. John C. Coates IV, M&A Contracts: Purposes, Types, Regulation, and 
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tiations, but it does not obviate the need to construct a risk-allo-
cation apparatus. 
In fact, one can view RWI as an additional transaction (or 
two) to engineer. Lawyers must not only draft and negotiate the 
acquisition agreement, but also the RWI policy terms and a bro-
ker engagement.115 And the lawyer must then consider a series 
of questions about the extent to which the policy coverage and 
acquisition agreement coordinate.116  
Moving beyond agreement design, adding the insurer and 
broker to the deal complicates the project-management func-
tion.117 RWI means more data room permissions, a longer closing 
checklist, a multiparty diligence call, and more redlines.  
RWI also adds to the transaction-regulatory function by 
bringing insurance law into the mix.118 The average deal lawyer 
may not be steeped in specialized legal doctrines governing the 
validity, interpretation, and scope of insurance policies, but 
M&A departments are heading in that direction. A small but no-
ticeable number of M&A lawyers are re-branding themselves as 
RWI specialists, a practice that lies at the intersection of M&A 
and insurance law.119  
Note too how RWI leans heavily on law firm reputation—a 
key attribute of deal lawyers discussed in Part I. Prominent 
firms add credence to the reps that lawyers negotiate and the 
due diligence reports they create.120 In other ways, brokers are 
well positioned to compete for a larger role in agreement negoti-
ation and diligence. In particular, they likely have as much mar-
ket data as law firms on the topic of post-closing liability.121 But 
 
Patterns of Practice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
29 (Claire Hill & Steven Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016) (providing an overview of 
the content of merger agreements). 
 115. See supra Part II.C.1&2 (describing the proposal and policy negotiation 
phases). 
 116. See supra Part II.C.3 (describing negotiation of the acquisition agree-
ment). 
 117. See supra Part I.A.2 (describing the project management function of 
deal lawyers). 
 118. See supra Part I.A.2 (describing the transaction-regulatory function of 
deal lawyers). 
 119. See Interviewee #1, supra note 43 (describing the interviewee’s transi-
tion from M&A lawyer to insurance specialist); Interviewee #4, supra note 66 
(describing a career transition from M&A lawyer to insurance specialist). 
 120. See supra Part II.C.4 (describing the role of law firm reputation in the 
due diligence process).  
 121. See supra note 69. 
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perhaps an upstart brokerage group cannot lend a client the 
same kind of reputation as a white-shoe law firm. 
Perhaps the clearest indication that RWI leaves plenty on 
the lawyer’s plate is the new role of underwriter’s counsel. Be-
cause of underwriters’ lean staffing, it is standard to charge a 
$25,000 to $50,000 underwriting fee used to pay for outside coun-
sel to the underwriter. These lawyers help review a buyer’s dili-
gence reports, participate in the diligence call, and craft exclu-
sions.122  
Putting it all together, deal lawyers seem to view RWI as a 
re-direction as much as an incursion, even if it does replace or 
hasten some traditional functions of deal lawyers. Time saved on 
representations and warranties is likely to be spent advising on 
other aspects of the deal—break-up fees, closing conditions, and 
purchase price adjustments, for example.123 Prominent M&A 
firms tout their knowledge of RWI as a way to differentiate 
themselves and improve client service by adding a new “tool.”124 
As one interviewee explains, “[l]awyers are happy to see” RWI 
because it “emphasizes a different skill set within the deal.”125 
B. BUT THERE’S A CATCH 
It is also worthwhile to think about RWI’s future. Specifi-
cally, does RWI have to remain so deferential to the status quo? 
 From Griffith’s standpoint, the question seems to be 
whether RWI has much of a future at all. He considers, for ex-
ample, whether we are at the top of a cycle that is due for a cor-
rection as loose underwriting standards catch up to insurers and 
dampen enthusiasm for RWI.126 Several interviewees echo this 
 
 122. See Interviewee #1, supra note 43 (discussing underwriter’s counsel); 
Interviewee #9, supra note 43 (describing the role of underwriter’s counsel); In-
terviewee #14, supra note 65 (describing the role of underwriters counsel). 
 123. See Interviewee #1, supra note 43 (stating that lawyers “end up spend-
ing time on the termination provisions or something like that”); Interviewee #2, 
supra note 43 (stating that lawyers find negotiation of reps to be a “slog of a 
conversation” and that they still “find ways to deliver value”); Interviewee #12, 
supra note 43 (“Lawyers always find a way to recapture time lost.”); Interviewee 
#17, supra note 75 (suggesting that RWI allows M&A lawyers to focus on other 
“value” such as tax efficiency). 
 124. See Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (describing RWI as a “tool for the 
client toolbox”); Interviewee #11, supra note 51 (describing RWI as another “tool 
in your toolbox”); Interviewee #17, supra note 75 (“We appreciate it as a tool.”). 
 125. Interviewee #5, supra note 44. 
 126. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1918–20; see also Interviewee # 1, supra 
note 43 (“We don’t know what it looks like in a downturn.”); Interview #2, supra 
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concern by noting lax underwriting practices by new entrants,127 
increasingly buyer-friendly formulations of reps,128 reluctance 
by some law firms to provide fulsome diligence reports,129 and 
aggressive claims by some insured parties.130  
Griffith also raises interesting questions about the product’s 
efficiency from the perspective of buyers, sellers, and their eco-
nomic stakeholders. As Griffith points out, we usually find in-
surance where it serves some useful risk-spreading purpose, but 
here the ultimate economic stakeholders are diversified public 
shareholders and institutional investors who should not be espe-
cially risk averse as to a particular deal.131 So what’s going on? 
Griffith looks to the inner workings of private equity funds and 
hypothesizes that RWI could be either a play by fund managers 
to increase their compensation at the expense of investors or a 
rational adjustment to fund manager incentives that helpfully 
encourages managers to take appropriate levels of risk.132 
 
note 43 (noting that there is a “good trajectory of claims” but that people could 
go back to escrows if there is bad behavior in claims); Interviewee #4, supra note 
66 (stating that RWI could “fizzle out” if insurers stop paying claims); Inter-
viewee #5, supra note 44 (discussing effects of a carrier facing a large claim 
because of poor underwriting). 
 127. See Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (suggesting that lower quality under-
writers will “burn through the market”); Interviewee #13, supra note 75 (noting 
that “inexperienced” insurers cover forward-looking reps or “business risks” 
that were originally excluded from RWI). 
 128. See Interviewee #15, supra note 75 (noting that some firms “get aggres-
sive” with the reps and use the existence of RWI as an argument for requesting 
a broader rep); see also supra note 75 (describing the effect of RWI on the 
breadth of reps). 
 129. See Interviewee #12, supra note 43 (noting a trend of law firms resisting 
producing full diligence reports, and instead proposing to issue only “red-flag” 
reports); Interviewee #15, supra note 75 (explaining that some law firms pro-
pose to provide only red-flag reports rather than full diligence reports); Inter-
viewee #16, supra note 75 (observing that RWI’s knowledge exclusion is “short-
ening the length of diligence reports” and that some firms are hesitating to 
provide full written diligence reports). 
 130. See Interviewee #13, supra note 75 (noting that some insureds assert 
questionable claims); Interviewee #14, supra note 65 (reporting interactions 
with plaintiffs lawyers focusing on RWI insurance claims); Interviewee #15, su-
pra note 75 (reporting an increase in lost-customer breaches and expressing 
concern that buyers might look to RWI as a source of capital in a downturn). 
 131. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1889 (noting that only sellers of manager-
owned firms would be risk averse and that such sellers are rare in insured 
deals). 
 132. See id. 
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For purposes of this discussion, we do not need to resolve 
these important questions. Even if the underwriting cycle turns, 
for example, RWI might change or retreat but would presumably 
not vanish altogether.133 As to the internal incentives of private 
equity investing, RWI could survive as either a useful adjust-
ment to manager incentives or a persistent agency cost that is 
not worth resolving.134 Either way, interviewees generally as-
sume that RWI will have some kind of future based on its potent 
effect on competitive sale processes and growing acceptance in 
the market.135  
If RWI is here to stay, then we should consider how it might 
evolve. Imaging this future raises an intriguing possibility—rep 
and warranty construction is ripe for technological innovation 
and insurers might be better positioned than lawyers to lead 
these efforts.  
Recall one of the more surprising aspects of RWI. Insurers 
do not dictate the wording of the reps for which they assume li-
ability.136 They may police the outer boundaries by excluding or 
writing out some individual reps,137 but according to Griffith 
standard exclusions are narrowing.138 Nor do insurers seem to 
 
 133. See Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (suggesting that sell-side policies 
could become more popular in a downturn).  
 134. Many agency costs are irresolvable. For example, corporate managers 
and corporate shareholders have different appetites for risk, creating agency 
costs that can be mitigated but not eliminated. See Abraham J.B. Cable, Oppor-
tunity-Cost Conflicts in Corporate Law, 66 CASE WESTERN RESERVE L. REV. 51, 
70–71 (2015) (discussing incentives resulting from equity compensation to cor-
porate managers). 
 135. Interviewee # 2, supra note 43 (suggesting that when RWI first came 
into use it would “shut down an auction overnight” and that the product has 
become sufficiently attractive to withstand a market downturn); Interviewee 
#3, supra note 43 (suggesting that RWI has become an “average part of the pro-
cess” and will persist); Interviewee #5, supra note 44 (stating that RWI is “here 
to stay”); Interviewee #12, supra note 43 (suggesting that buyers and sellers 
would not likely go back to indemnities and escrows even in an economic slow-
down); Interviewee #13, supra note 75 (suggesting that law firms will continue 
recommending RWI because it reduces their malpractice exposure and that a 
generation of lawyers will be used to it as a part of standard deal practice). 
 136. See supra note 79 (discussing the limited role of underwriters in nego-
tiating acquisition agreements).  
 137. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing the circumstances 
in which an insurer will exclude or write out a rep).  
 138. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1868; Interviewee #11, supra note 51 (stat-
ing that insurers do not “fly speck” acquisition agreements and have limited 
exclusions for coverage). 
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exert significant influence over the scope of reps through charg-
ing higher premiums for more generous reps.139 In fact, when 
Griffith observes RWI having an influence on the acquisition 
agreement, it seems to pull in the opposite direction by broaden-
ing the seller’s reps.140 On the whole, insurers appear to leave 
the acquisition agreement to the lawyers based on a combination 
of confidence in the buyer’s and seller’s incentives141 and com-
mercial necessity.142  
But perhaps insurers could do better. Consider some of the 
limitations of the lawyer-led approach that currently sets the 
scope of reps. Start with the example Griffith provides in his in-
troduction. Increasingly, buyers are asking for a rep that “no al-
legations of sexual harassment have been made to the Company 
against any individual in his or her capacity as an employee of 
the Company.”143 Buyer’s counsel asks for the rep because highly 
publicized examples of recent litigation made some client or law-
yer, somewhere along the way, alert to a particular kind of risk. 
Now the rep is “market.” Seller’s counsel knows the customary 
counter moves, which might include objecting that the rep is 
costly to confirm, is ambiguous (what counts as an “allegation”?), 
covers matters that the buyer may exacerbate by mishandling, 
and simply presents too much risk for the seller. Buyer’s counsel 
 
 139. Griffith observes pricing is highly standardized and driven in large part 
by competition rather than the wording or scope of the reps. See Griffith, supra 
note 5, at 1867 n. 152 (discussing survey results); see also Interviewee #14, su-
pra note 65 (suggesting that pricing is “market-driven” and “not quantitatively 
sound”); Interviewee #15, supra note 75 (describing RWI pricing as “highly un-
actuarial” and “not very scientific” as opposed to auto or homeowners insur-
ance); Interviewee #16, supra note 75 (suggesting that pricing is more qualita-
tive than “actuarial” or “scientific”). One interviewee suggests that underwrit-
ers do offer lower pricing to sophisticated repeat players (such as private equity 
sponsors) than to inexperienced founder/managers. See Interviewee #13, supra 
note 75. Another interviewee explains that it is difficult to adjust pricing to un-
derwriting risk because price quotes are given in an initial proposal before un-
derwriting is complete. See Interviewee #14, supra note 65. But see Interviewee 
#16, supra note 75 (suggesting that underwriters can adjust pricing to the scope 
of reps because they have at least an early draft of the acquisition agreement at 
the proposal stage). 
 140. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text (discussing findings from 
Griffith’s study of acquisition agreements). 
 141. See supra notes 84, 95–99 and accompanying text (discussing the value 
that insurers place on customizing reps through negotiation between the buyer 
and seller and the incentives of buyers to verify full disclosure by sellers). 
 142. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing the commercial 
necessity of fitting within normal deal process). 
 143. Griffith, supra note 5, at 1841. 
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must advise whether to push for the rep, agree to various quali-
fications, or ask for offsetting concessions.  
Embedded in this negotiation is a series of risk assessments. 
But do deal lawyers have the right kind of data or information 
to make these assessments? As discussed above, De Fontenay 
explores one relevant attribute of deal lawyers—extensive mar-
ket knowledge.144 A law firm’s experience can be incorporated 
into a lawyer’s advice through customary practice, ad hoc 
searches of document management systems, deal studies, and 
firm forms. But these mechanisms do not systematically collect 
outcomes—the frequency and magnitude of claims under a given 
rep.145 Deal lawyers see claims on only an ad hoc basis—their 
firm might be involved in an indemnification claim and a deal 
lawyer might have continued involvement in that part of the rep-
resentation.146 But as one insurance professional puts it, lawyers 
may often be engineering “in a vacuum.”147  
Brokers and underwriters, on the other hand, may have bet-
ter information and motivation for sophisticated data analysis, 
and they can use that information to refine risk assessment.148 
Like law firms, insurance professionals have copies of acquisi-
tion agreements, including reps. In fact, they may see a higher 
volume of deals than lawyers.149 They have access to accounting 
information and a data room that provides a trove of demo-
graphic information—industry focus, ownership structure, firm 
age, etc.—that might affect risk assessments.150 Importantly, in-
 
 144. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
 145. See Spencer Williams, Predictive Contracting, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 621, 627–29, 685 (2019) (distinguishing between data based on historical 
contract terms and data that includes contracting outcomes). 
 146. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43 (suggesting that the interviewee had 
limited visibility to rep and warranty claims as an M&A lawyer); Interviewee 
#11, supra note 51 (suggesting that M&A lawyers will have some visibility to 
the claims process because the client will often use the same firm that handled 
the transaction). 
 147. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43; Interviewee #10, supra note 51 (sug-
gesting that very few law firms have the data to make refined predictions about 
deal risk). 
 148. See Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (stating that insurers have “so much 
data to analyze” that they “can make risk management efficient”). 
 149. See supra note 69 (reporting that insurance professionals are exposed 
to more deals than lawyers). 
 150. See supra Parts II.C.1&4 (discussing the insurer’s access to information 
at the proposal and diligence stages). 
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surance professionals also have extensive information about out-
comes such as claims notices and dispositions.151 Crucially, in-
surers and their underwriters should be especially motivated to 
collect and analyze this information because of their direct finan-
cial exposure to those claims.152  
There would seem to be an opportunity to use emerging data 
analytics tools—such as machine learning153 and natural lan-
guage processing154—to make increasingly refined predictions 
about how particular formulations of reps perform under speci-
fied conditions. For example, such an analysis could predict the 
likelihood that the sexual-harassment rep described above will 
result in claims. A similar analysis could be performed for differ-
ent formulations of the rep that limit coverage to only five years 
or qualify the rep to the knowledge of high-level executives. The 
analysis could control for relevant firm characteristics—indus-
try, employee count, etc. An insurance company could distill this 
information into differentiated premiums based on agreement 
language and deal characteristics. 
This kind of pricing could produce significant benefits for 
both insurance companies and transacting parties (buyer and 
sellers). For an insurance company, more discriminating pricing 
would first and foremost allow price competition while maintain-
ing acceptable underwriting standards and claims history—in 
short, more profits. Taking the thought experiment one step fur-
ther, insurance professionals could use these analytical tools to 
develop ancillary services—assisting with due diligence, for ex-
ample.155 For buyers and sellers, the benefits could be twofold. 
 
 151. See supra Part II.C.5 (discussing the role of underwriters and brokers 
in claims management). 
 152. Even third-party underwriters have financial exposure to claims. They 
are compensated based in part on claims experience from deals they underwrite. 
See Interviewee #9, supra note 43 (describing third-party underwriter compen-
sation); Interviewee #15, supra note 75 (reporting that managing general un-
derwriter compensation is affected by insurer losses). 
 153. See Williams, supra note 145, at 634 (“Machine learning is a category 
of artificial intelligence research that focuses on building mathematical com-
puter models that learn from data to improve over time.”). 
 154. See id. at 653 (“Natural language processing (NLP) is a category of ma-
chine learning research focused on enabling computers to understand natural 
language communication.”). 
 155. One insurance professional suggests that a skeleton crew and techno-
logical tools might be suitable to diligence small deals, but not larger deals. See 
Interviewee #10, supra note 51. 
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First, they might benefit from better pricing for the risk-spread-
ing function for which they already buy RWI. Second, premiums 
calculated in this matter might convey important information 
about previously unquantifiable matters that could become 
sticking points in negotiations. The premium, after all, would 
represent the magnitude and probability of undisclosed matters 
within the scope of a particular formulation of rep.156 This kind 
of residual risk, or in Griffith’s terminology “unknown un-
knowns,”157 is a type that will otherwise be hazy to both buyer 
and seller.158 
Armed with this knowledge, we might expect insurers to di-
rectly or indirectly exert greater influence over the acquisition 
agreement. They might indirectly influence reps by resulting 
coverage decisions or pricing. More aggressively, insurers might 
offer packages of coverage, including menus of pre-set reps, at 
different price points.159 It stands to reason that the party with 
the best information will ultimately dictate rep construction, and 
at some point that principle may override the inertia of the sta-
tus quo. 
The technological innovation is not as far-flung as it might 
sound. In a recent article, Professor Spencer Williams described 
an emerging field of “predictive contracting.”160 Using machine 
 
 156. The premium would also include other elements. See Griffith, supra 
note 5, at 1844 n. 17 (“The insurance premium must incorporate not only the 
present value of expected losses but also the insurance company’s costs and 
profit margin.”). 
 157. Id. at 1911. 
 158. For example, the analysis might result in the same high premium for: 
(a) the broad form of sexual-harassment rep described above and (b) a more 
circumscribed version of the rep that is limited by time (the previous five years). 
The high premium suggests to the buyer that sexual harassment is likely to be 
a source of risk. The consistent pricing between the two alternatives suggests 
that the risk of claims older than five years is low (so additional coverage for 
that period is cheap). In contrast, if the broad form of rep is substantially more 
expensive than the narrow form, that suggests that there is meaningful risk of 
claims older than five years. Admittedly, the price signal might not always be 
so straightforward. If an insurer will cover broad or narrow forms of the rep for 
a low premium, that could signal either that sexual harassment is a low risk or 
that all forms of the rep produce enough disclosure to surface the risk in disclo-
sure schedules (and therefore take the matter outside of RWI coverage). 
 159. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43 (suggesting that menus of represen-
tations could be developed with more claims experience and analysis); Inter-
viewee #13, supra note 75 (suggesting that insurers will develop “synthetic reps” 
and that buyers will receive “a quote and attached variations with pricing”). 
 160. Williams defines predictive contracting as “a new method of contracting 
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learning and natural language processing, large in-house legal 
departments and startups are systematically analyzing con-
tracts, background conditions, and outcomes to improve the de-
sign of commercial contracts.161  
To be clear, it is uncertain whether the insurance industry 
has the capacity and appetite for these innovations. Just as some 
commentators question the capacity of law firms to innovate,162 
insurers may not prioritize this kind of innovation, especially 
while the current RWI product is still growing and competition 
for deals remains stiff.163 
Moreover, even a more assertive form of RWI would not spell 
extinction for M&A lawyers. Presumably, clients would still turn 
to lawyers to help select among different pricing options, design 
other aspects of the acquisition agreement, handle transaction-
regulatory work, and manage the deal. What might be lost is a 
chunk of agreement design and some kinds of diligence. While 
these functions are important to law firms in that they provide 
opportunities for training associates and leveraging partners’ 
human capital,164 they ultimately represent a modest part of the 
deal lawyer’s diversified portfolio of functions and attributes. 
The incursion into deal lawyers’ design function could be mean-
ingful, but not existential.  
 
in which contract drafters can design contracts using a technology system that 
helps predict the connections between contract terms and outcomes.” Williams, 
supra note 145, at 621. 
 161. Williams discusses one especially relevant example. A company named 
Kira Systems is developing technology that will “identify the likelihood of liti-
gation risk associated with specific terms in acquisition agreements based on 
data of past agreements and litigation.” Id. at 637–38. 
 162. See Green, supra note 28, at 2 (describing law firms as “notoriously ret-
icent to implement emerging technologies” based on risk aversion and economic 
incentives). 
 163. See Interviewee #10, supra note 51 (suggesting that insurers might be 
reluctant to innovate as long as there is “untapped growth potential for incum-
bents”); Interviewee #12, supra note 43 (suggesting that intense competition 
makes it hard for underwriters to assert more control over reps); Interviewee 
#15, supra note 75 (explaining how difficult it is for an underwriter to push back 
in negotiations because of the willingness of competitors to insure). 
 164. See MARC GALANTER AND THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 89–93 (1991) (theorizing that the 
principal function of law firms is to maximize the human capital of partners, in 
part through pushing work to associates). 
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C. SO WHAT? 
It is customary to conclude a piece on transactional lawyer-
ing with a suggestion for how legal educators can better prepare 
future deal lawyers. Past recommendations include teaching 
more finance and transaction-cost economics to hone the design 
function,165 using the traditional case method to prepare stu-
dents for transaction-regulatory work,166 and teaching soft skills 
to encourage good relations with opposing counsel.167 Because 
this essay highlights deal lawyers’ varied roles, it is hard to ar-
gue with any of the proposals.  
Perhaps the more valuable lesson in this case is to take no-
tice of the starring role played by former M&A lawyers in devel-
oping the market for RWI. For RWI to gain acceptance, insur-
ance professionals needed to “speak the language” of deals.168 
The RWI universe remains populated largely by former M&A 
lawyers now working as brokers or underwriters.169 Interview-
ees describe experience as an M&A lawyer as being nearly es-
sential for a career on the insurance side.170  
 
 165. See Gilson, supra note 1, at 305. 
 166. See Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 507–08. 
 167. See id. 
 168. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43 (discussing how former M&A lawyers 
had to “roll up their sleeves” and build a product that was compatible with M&A 
practice). 
 169. See supra note 54 (discussing former M&A lawyers who became bro-
kers); see also Interviewee #9, supra note 43 (noting the prevalence of former 
attorneys at an underwriter); Interviewee #10, supra note 51 (describing a tran-
sition from M&A lawyer to insurance professional); Interviewee #12, supra note 
43 (describing a transition from M&A lawyer to underwriter and then broker); 
Interviewee #14, supra note 65 (describing a transition from M&A lawyer to 
underwriter); Interviewee #15, supra note 75 (discussing a common career path 
of M&A lawyer to underwriter); Interviewee #16, supra note 75 (describing a 
career transition from M&A lawyer to underwriter). 
 170. See Interviewee #12, supra note 43 (suggesting that 3–6 years of expe-
rience as an M&A lawyer is expected for an RWI underwriter and that nonlaw-
yers and hires directly out of law school are rare). But see Interviewee #13, supra 
note 75 (describing a litigation career prior to becoming an underwriter); Inter-
viewee #14, supra note 65 (describing efforts to build a pipeline of law school 
graduates but acknowledging the need for M&A experience to lead hard negoti-
ations); Interviewee #15, supra note 75 (discussing an underwriter practice of 
mostly hiring out of large M&A firms with only limited hiring directly out of law 
school or of non-JDs); Interviewee #16, supra note 75 (describing M&A practice 
experience as essential for a position as lead underwriter, but noting some suc-
cess in training non-JDs and other specialists for other positions on an under-
writing team). 
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These former lawyers are a JD-advantage success story.171 
They seem satisfied with their atypical career path172 even if it 
lacks some of the prestige of a large national law firm.173 The 
compensation is competitive,174 the hours no worse,175 and I 
sensed in them some entrepreneurial pride in having played a 
role in building the RWI market.  
A key question for law schools is how proactively we should 
prepare our students for these kinds of JD-advantage opportu-
nities. Is it just idiosyncratic good fortune that some lawyers find 
careers in law-adjacent fields? Or should we be developing cur-
riculum to support the kind of marketing skills exhibited by RWI 
brokers and the technical skills necessary for the innovations 
contemplated above? Do incoming law students want that kind 
of education and are law schools the right institutions to deliver 
it?  
The answers to those questions are beyond the scope of this 






 171. A JD-advantage job is one for which a law degree is beneficial but not 
required. Approximately 15% of law school graduates accept JD-advantage jobs. 
See Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, What Do We Know About JD Advantage 
Jobs?, NALP (November 2017), https://www.nalp.org/1117research [https:// 
perma.cc/UY65-SF34]. 
 172. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43 (suggesting dissatisfaction with the 
professional role of an M&A lawyer); Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (stating that 
the interviewee would recommend working for a brokerage); Interviewee #15, 
supra note 75 (reporting that the interviewee is “absolutely” satisfied with a 
career as an underwriter). 
 173. Interviewees note that insurance has higher status in Europe than in 
the U.S. See Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (reporting that working in insurance 
felt like a “knock down in prestige” and noting different perceptions of insurance 
in other countries). One broker explains that you should not expect to be sur-
rounded by “mahogany and scotch” working in the U.S. insurance market. See 
Interview with Interviewee #8, Anonymous Insurance Professional (on file with 
author). Another interviewee was told that going from law firm to brokerage 
was an “off-ramp for your career.” See Interviewee #3, supra note 43. 
 174. See Interviewee #3, supra note 43; Interviewee #12, supra note 43 (sug-
gesting compensation is a little less as an insurance professional). 
 175. See Interviewee #9, supra note 43; Interviewee #12, supra note 43 (sug-
gesting that quality of life is somewhat better as an insurance professional and 
that “people are more fun on this side”). 
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CONCLUSION 
To date, RWI underscores the durability of lawyers’ central 
role in M&A transactions. Lawyers enjoy significant built-in ad-
vantages as incumbents. Re-working their customary process 
has a high price. On the other hand, if one looks over the horizon, 
insurance professionals seem especially well situated to change 
the status quo through technological innovation. Given the 
prominent role of former M&A lawyers in developing RWI, we 
might ultimately think of RWI’s next step as an opportunity for 
a broadly defined legal profession.  
 
 
